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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ZACHERY DON ZAELIT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20090405-CA

Defendant Zachary Zaelit has raised a sufficiency issue on appeal where the State
relied solely on inconsistent out-of-court statements for the conviction. See Br. of
Appellant, dated August 27, 2009. The out-of-court statements were unsworn and they
lacked corroboration and reliability. See State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989)
(recognizing that inconsistent out-of-court statements are insufficient for a conviction);
State ex reL C.L.. No. 20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221 (unpublished) (stating
uncorroborated "'out-of-court statements] which [are] denied at trial by the declarant
[are] insufficient by [themselves] to sustain a conviction'") (alterations in original) (citation omitted); State v. Hamilton, No. 20060131-CA, 2007 UT App 130 (unpublished).
The State disagrees. It claims this Court should refuse to reach the merits of the
issue since Zaelit has not raised a "concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim."
Br. of Appellee, 11. Yet Zaelit has presented the issue under the plain-error doctrine. Br.
of Appellant, Part D. That is appropriate and does not require a corresponding claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court may reach the merits of the issue here. IcL

1

In addition, the State claims that inconsistent out-of-court statements are enough to
support a conviction. In connection with that argument, the State impugns Ramsey, 782
P.2d 480. See_ Br. of Appellee, 18. And it cites to the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. Br. of Appellee, 17. Yet Ramsey is relevant to the issue here. In addition, this
Court will assess the issue with the reasonable-doubt standard in mind. See State v.
Hglggte, 2000 UT 74, ^f 18, 10 P.3d 346 (stating a reviewing court will consider whether
the evidence was such that reasonable minds entertained reasonable doubt). Under that
standard, the evidence was insufficient. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and
here, Zaelit respectfully asks this Court to reverse the conviction.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT,
A. AS A PROCEDURAL MATTER, ZAELIT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
RAISE THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUE UNDER THE INEFFECTIVEASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL DOCTRINE.
According to the State, this Court should not reach the merits of Zaelit5 s argument
on appeal for procedural reasons. Br. of Appellee, 10-11. The State acknowledges that
Zaelit has raised the issue under the plain-error doctrine; however, it claims that because
Zaelit did not address ineffective assistance of counsel, the plain-error argument is undermined. Id. It has cited to State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), yacated,
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). Br. of Appellee, 11. Yet the State's arguments are mistaken.
Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that when defense counsel has not
preserved a sufficiency issue at trial, a defendant must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11; see also icL_ at ^ 12

(stating "'the exceptional circumstances exception5" applies "'to rare procedural anomalies'") (citation omitted). The plain-error doctrine is the appropriate vehicle to review an
unpreserved sufficiency claim since it "enables the appellate court to 'balance the need
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness'" and it permits the appellate court
"'to avoid injustice.'" Id ^ 13 (citations omitted); see also id, at 115 (recognizing that a
trial court may be obliged to dismiss a charge for insufficient evidence under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-17-3 (1999)). Since the Utah Supreme Court has not required a defendant on
appeal to "raise a concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim" (Br. of Appellee,
11) for the sufficiency issue, see_ Holggte, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11-17, n.5 (relying on plain
error and exceptional circumstances), the State's argument here is irrelevant.
Moreover, the State's reliance on Labrwn, is misplaced. In Labrum, the defendant
argued, among other things, that the trial court erred when it failed to make written
findings for an enhanced sentence under a Utah statute. See 881 P.2d at 903, 905. Since
defense counsel did not object in the trial court, the defendant raised the issue on appeal
under the plain-error standard. Id In response, the State urged this Court to rule that the
issue was waived. See id. at 905. Consequently - and notwithstanding the argument for
plain error - this Court ruled that "Labrum's failure to object to the enhancement of his
sentence absent adequate written findings precludes our considering the issue when
raised for the first time on appeal." IjL_ at 906. According to the Court, "if the error was
plain to the [trial] court, it should also have been plain to trial counsel, who should have
raised an appropriate objection. For this reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel typically is raised in conjunction with alleging plain error." Id

After this Court issued its decision in Labrum, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed
the matter. See 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). It ruled that the trial court committed plain
error when it failed to enter written findings for an enhanced sentence under the Utah
statute. See. uL_ Notably, the supreme court did not embrace the notion that defense
counsel's failure to object in the trial court would preclude review under the plain-error
standard. It stated, "We hold that the trial court's failure to enter the written findings of
fact as required by the gang sentence enhancement statute was plain error and that the
Court of Appeals erred in not addressing the issue notwithstanding defendant's failure to
object in the trial court." IcL
In accordance with the supreme court's decision in Labrum, 925 P.2d at 937, and
contrary to the State's assertions (see Br. of Appellee, 10-11), this Court may address
Zaelit's sufficiency issue for plain error "notwithstanding defendant's failure to object in
the trial court." Lgbrum, 925 P.2d at 937. Indeed, under Utah law, Zaelit was not
required to raise a "concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim" (Br. of Appellee,
11) for review of the sufficiency issue on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,fflf11-17, n.5.
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT INCONSISTENT OUT-OF-COURT
STATEMENTS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PREPONDERANCE-OF-THEEVIDENCE STANDARD. EVEN IF THAT IS SO. THE STATEMENTS ARE
INSUFFICIENT FOR A CRIMINAL CONVICTION.
The State charged Zaelit with theft by receiving a stolen car. See R. 1-3
(referencing July 20 and 21, 2008). Witnesses Copper Hinton, Britnee Emery, and Justin
Llewelyn were with Zaelit on July 20 and July 21. See R. 143:66, 68-71, 76; 143:87-88,
95-96; 143:106-10. They testified that Zaelit did not steal or possess the car, and he did

not aid in the theft or possession of the car. See Br. of Appellant, Part C. In addition, the
car was not found on Zaelit's property; it was found at a trailer home belonging to
Shauna Green. R. 143:53-55, 157-58. Also, the owner of the car, Christine Armstrong,
did not describe finding items belonging to Zaelit in the car. R. 143:54-55. And officers
did not find Zaelit's fingerprints in the car or on items relating to the car. See R. 143.
According to the witnesses, Justin Llewelyn stole the car and drove it to Green's
trailer home. R. 143:90-91, 106-10, 116. Also, Justin removed a license plate from the
car. R. 143:111-12. He threw the license plate on or in a 1967 Chrysler in the carport.
R. 143:124. Shauna Green had access to areas where Justin placed the license plate and
she had the opportunity to bring the license plate into the trailer home. See R. 143:58-60,
157-58 (stating an officer found a license plate in a bedroom while executing a search
warrant; also, Green was at the trailer home on July 21 and did not consent to a search of
the trailer requiring officers to return later with a warrant).
Notwithstanding the testimony from witnesses, the State introduced evidence that
on July 21, 2008, Copper, Britnee, and Justin made unsworn out-of-court statements
implicating Zaelit in the theft. R. 143:144-45, 148-49 (Detective Kaer claimed Copper
and Britnee implicated Zaelit); 143:127-30 (Agent Olive claimed Justin made various
statements). Yet Copper, Britnee, and Justin denied the prior statements. See_ R. 143:68,
71-74 (Copper did not remember); 143:90-92, 100-01 (Britnee claimed the statements
were not true); 143:114; see also R. 143:117, 118 (Justin denied talking to officers).
In addition, the inconsistent out-of-court statements lacked trustworthiness. See
State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, f 52, 67 P.3d 477 (identifying factors for assessing the

credibility of out-of-court statements); Scott v. HK Contractors. 2008 UT App 370, ^ 10,
196 P.3d 635 (identifying factors for reliability), cert, denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah 2009);
State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, % 27, 32 P.3d 976 (identifying factors to consider for
reliability of an out-of-court statement). For example, when Justin purportedly made the
out-of-court statements, he changed his story several times, R. 143:127-30, undermining
credibility. Also, Justin was directly involved in the theft, see, e.g., R. 1-3 (charging
Justin as a co-defendant), and thus motivated to make statements to curry favor with
authorities in the hopes that they would be lenient with him. See_ Webster, 2001 UT App
238, \ 27 (stating "probable motive" is a factor); Br. of Appellant, Part C.2.(b).
In addition, both Copper and Britnee testified that their out-of-court statements
were unreliable. Both were high on drugs. R. 143:67-68,74-76; 143:88,91-95. Both
were treated as suspects. See.R. 1-3; 143:80. Both gave reasons for misleading officers
where Copper would have said anything to get out of the interrogation room at the police
department, R. 143:74, 80, 81; and Britnee was mad at Zaelit and wanted to get him in
trouble. R. 143: 85-86, 90, 92, 94, 100, 102; see also Br. of Appellant, Part C.2.(b).
Even though the out-of-court statements lacked corroboration and reliability, the
State maintains on appeal that they are sufficient to sustain the verdict. Br. of Appellee,
13-17. According to the State, "three" out-of-court statements presented through State
agents made it "'more probable' that Defendant was in fact the car thief and "more
probable" that witnesses did not falsely implicate Zaelit. IdL, 17.
Yet the State has applied an incorrect standard. It has looked to the preponderance
of the evidence for civil cases. That standard "requires that the evidence be such that

reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe that the existence of the fact is more
probable or more likely" than not. Morris v. Farmers Home Mutual Ins. Co., 500 P.2d
505, 507 (Utah 1972) (emphasis added). The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is
insufficient for a criminal conviction. State v. Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1960)
(stating the preponderance standard - "or a finding that guilt is more probable than
innocence" - is insufficient for a criminal conviction); see also State v. Robbins, 2009 UT
23, \ 16, 210 P.3d 288 (recognizing that the civil standard is less exacting than the
criminal standard); State v. Reyes\ 2005 UT 33, ^37, 116 P.3d 305 (promulgating a safeharbor instruction for reasonable doubt where the jury is advised that the criminal
standard for reasonable doubt is more powerful than the civil standard). Consequently,
based on the State's argument on appeal - Br. of Appellee, 17 (relying on the "more
probable" standard) - the evidence here was insufficient.
Moreover, under the reasonable-doubt standard, courts have ruled that multiple
uncorroborated out-of-court statements are insufficient. Specifically, in Acosta v. State,
417 A.2d 373 (Del. 1980), the State charged the defendant with four counts of rape, and
relied on direct testimony from two victims for counts one and two. M at 374. With
respect to counts three and four, both victims testified at trial that they were not subjected
to sexual acts. Id, at 375. Consequently, the State relied on an officer and the stepfather
to present out-of-court statements from the victims. IdL at 374-75.
In reviewing the "sufficiency of the evidence," the Delaware Supreme Court ruled
that the out-of-court statements qualified as "affirmative evidence" with substantive
value. IcL at 376-77, 377 n.3. However, given the inconsistencies between the in-court

and out-of-court statements, the out-of-court statements alone were insufficient: the court
ruled sua sponte that the jury should have been specially advised "as to the unusual care
that must be taken before convicting a defendant of a particular offense" based on such
statements. IcL at 377-78 (stating "the legal point" raised by the sufficiency issue related
to the need for a special instruction). It reversed the convictions on the latter counts. Id.
Likewise, in State v. Pierce* 906 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), the evidence
was insufficient. In that case, a jury convicted the 41-year-old defendant of statutory rape
of 14-year-old KJB, and he appealed. IcL at 730. He raised a sufficiency issue, where
witnesses made out-of-court statements about his sexual relations with the girl, and then
either did not remember the statements, or recanted. Specifically, witness Redman lived
in a trailer park with the defendant, their three-year-old son, and the defendant's
daughter. IcL at 730-31. Redman made out-of-court statements to Agent Harms about
relations between the defendant and KJB. IcL at 731. Then at trial, Redman denied
telling Harms that defendant and KJB were having sex. IcL Also, she testified that when
she spoke to Agent Harms, "she was on medication for her seizures" and overdosed. Id.
"Therefore, anything she said or wrote during that time was incorrect." Id.
In addition, KJB testified at trial. She acknowledged that Harms and Deputy
Hubbs "came to visit her because o f Redman's report that "KJB and [the defendant] had
'slept together.'" 7#. at 732. KJB told the agents she had sex with the defendant, and she
agreed to make a recorded statement at the sheriffs office. See_ icL However, at trial,
KJB claimed her earlier statements were lies. IcL She testified that she told agents what
they wanted to hear "because she wanted to go home and be left alone." IcL

Agent Harms and Deputy Hubbs testified to out-of-court statements. IcL Their
evidence contradicted testimony from Redman and KJB. Specifically, Harms testified
that Redman made a hotline call that prompted Harms and Deputy Hubbs to go to KJB's
home to ask about the girl's sexual relations with the defendant. IcL at 731-32.
According to Harms, KJB was hostile but told her about intercourse with the defendant.
Id. at 732. Also, KJB accompanied Harms and Hubbs to the sheriffs office to tape a
statement, but the audio failed to work. Id Hubbs "gave the same testimony as did
Harms about the interview with KJB." IcL
In assessing the sufficiency issue on appeal, the Missouri court stated that
inconsistent out-of-court statements are admissible as substantive evidence. Id at 73334. Notwithstanding admissibility, statements may require corroboration if a witness's
testimony is contradictory and in conflict with facts, surrounding circumstances, and
common experience, and the contradictory testimony involves facts essential to the case.
See id. at 734-35. The court considered the "corroboration" rule to be necessary in
Pierce's case where "KJB's trial testimony was 180 degrees opposite of and contradictory
to her out-of-court statements on the absolutely essential element here, intercourse." Id
at 735. It stated the jury "should not have been merely free to decide which time KJB
was telling the truth, without the benefit of corroborating evidence." IcL
In addition, the court recognized that due process is violated if a jury convicts
based on an out-of-court statement lacking adequate safeguards, particularly since "[a]
less than impartial questioner could, hypothetically, maneuver the witness into giving an
inaccurate statement." IcL Also, the Missouri court looked specifically to the Utah

Supreme Court's decision in Ramsey, "a case where two children made prior statements
alleging sexual abuse but then recanted at trial." I(L at 736 (citing Ramsey, 782 P.2d at
483). It agreed with the Ramsey decision and the need for corroborating evidence; and it
reversed Pierce's conviction for insufficient evidence. IdL at 737.
In this case, the State has impugned Ramsey as a "plurality decision" with "limited
precedential value." Br. of Appellee, 18. Yet this Court has relied on Ramsey as
applicable law. State ex rel C.L., No. 20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221 (specifying that
Ramsey "unequivocally stated" the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court). In Ramsey, the
defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of child sexual abuse. 782 P.2d
at 482. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for count one where the State
alleged that he caused his five-year-old son "to take indecent liberties with his three-yearold daughter." IdL The daughter reported to her mother that "the boy and defendant had
played with her cpee pee.'" IcL In addition, the daughter told a social worker that "the
boy had lain on top of her and put his penis in her vagina while defendant watched. [The
social worker] testified that the boy corroborated the girl's story." Id. at 482.
At trial, the boy contradicted the social worker's testimony and denied that he
"told anyone that defendant had made him lie on the girl." I(L at 482, 483. Also, the girl
"did not testify as to whether defendant had caused the boy to simulate intercourse with
her." IdL at 482. Thus, the only "probative evidence" for count one came from the social
worker: he provided evidence of inconsistent out-of-court statements. M at 482-83.
In assessing the matter, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the evidence was
admissible as substantive evidence. IdL at 483. However, "not all substantive evidence is

of equal probative value." IcL Uncorroborated, unsworn out-of-court statements are
insufficient to support a criminal conviction. hL at 484.
[W]hen [out-of-court statements are] the only source of support for the central
allegations of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at all, meet the
minimal requirements of admissibility, we do not believe that a substantial factual
basis as to each element of the crime providing support for a conclusion of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt has been offered by the Government.
IcL (alterations in original) (quoting, inter alia, United States v. Oricco, 599 F.2d 113,
116 (6th Cir. 1979)). Also, "[a] conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence
cannot stand. It is a 'violation of due process to convict and punish a man without
evidence of his guilt.'" IcL at 483 (citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199,
206 (I960)): see State v. Gray. Ill P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986) (requiring the State to
"introduce evidence independent and exclusive of [a] conspirator's hearsay statement" to
show "the existence of a criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation
therein"); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163-64 n.15 (1970) (agreeing that
due process may "prevent convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally
lacking"); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945) (warning that a conviction
based on unsworn statements of witnesses would run "counter to the notions of fairness
on which our legal system is founded").
The Utah Supreme Court recently relied on Ramsey. See State v. Robbins, 2009
UT 23, If 14,210 P.3d 288 (quoting Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483). In Robbins, the supreme
court reversed the defendant's conviction where it was based on inconsistent m-court
statements. IcL at ^f 25 (reversing because of "inconsistencies in Taylor's testimony" and
clarifying the inherently-improbable standard). In its analysis, the court reiterated that

inconsistent statements made in court may warrant dismissal of a criminal charge. See icL
at f 21 & n.l (citing State v. Virzin. 2006 UT 29, ^ 25, 137 P.3d 787). Also, for a
criminal conviction, evidence must satisfy the reasonable-doubt standard. See id. atf 16.
In this case, the State based a felony conviction on unsworn out-of-court statements presented through its own officers. R. 143:140-59 (Kaer's testimony); 143:125-39
(Olive's testimony). The statements were not presented through a third party - like a
stepfather, as in Acosta, All A.2d at 374-75; or a counselor, as in Ramsey, 782 P.2d at
482-83. In addition, the officers did not record the statements. See R. 143:140-59;
143:125-39. Rather, they provided their own descriptions of the statements and of the
demeanor of the declarants. R. 143:143-45, 148-50 (reflecting that Kaer interviewed two
witnesses and considered the statements to be "the same"; also, he considered the
witnesses to be "honest right down to the drugs" they used); 143:126-30, 136-38
(reflecting that Olive interviewed the co-defendant Justin).
While the evidence of the out-of-court statements was admissible under Utah law,
that issue is separate and distinct from the question of sufficiency for a conviction since
"not all substantive evidence is of equal probative value." Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-84
(stating that such evidence is admissible but insufficient to sustain a conviction); Pierce,
906 S.W.2d at 734-35 (stating uncorroborated, inconsistent out-of-court statements are
admissible but insufficient, requiring reversal).
Indeed, the unsworn out-of-court statements here were unreliable. R. 143:68, 7176, 80-81 (Copper did not remember statements, she was on drugs, and she would have
said anything to get out of the interrogation room); 143:85-86, 88, 89, 90-95, 100-02

(Britnee maintained the statements were not true, she was on drugs, she lied about her
name, and she made statements to get Zaelit in trouble); 143:114-18 (Justin denied
talking to officers); 143:127-30 (Olive testified that Justin's responses were vague and he
changed his story); see Br. of Appellant, Part C.2; see also Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483 (the
boy denied making statements to the social worker); Pierce, 906 S.W.2d at 731, 732
(Redman claimed her out-of-court statements were incorrect because she had overdosed
on medication; and witness KJB lied to agents because she wanted to go home).
In addition, the record supports a "lack of trustworthiness in the atmosphere where
the prior out-of-court statements were] procured," Pierce, 906 S.W.2d at 735, since
officers acknowledged they obtained the statements in an interrogation setting, and the
witnesses were treated like suspects. See R. 143:126-28, 142-44; see also Webster, 2001
UT App 238, Tf 27 (identifying factors for trustworthiness, including, motivation, the
surrounding circumstances, the declarant's character for truthfulness, and whether the
statements were given voluntarily); State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (recognizing that "statements made in an obvious attempt to curry favor with the
authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack trustworthiness").
Moreover, the out-of-court statements lacked relevant corroboration where no
tangible, forensics, or direct evidence linked Zaelit to the car. See R. 143:53-55 (stating
Armstrong recovered items from the car, but failing to link items to Zaelit); R. 143:60-63
(stating officers recovered a license plate); R. 143:157-58 (stating Shauna Green owned
the trailer and required officers to return with a warrant to search areas in the trailer,
including the back room). In short, under established law, the inconsistent out-of-court

statements were insufficient for the conviction. See. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \ 16
(discussing the evidence necessary for reasonable doubt); Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-84
(recognizing that uncorroborated, out-of-court statements are insufficient); CJL., No.
20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221; Br. of Appellant, Argument.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated here and in the Brief of Appellant, Zachary Zaelit respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case for insufficient evidence.
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day of February, 2010.
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